Determining Categories of Reason Utilizing Functional Invariants
The historical backdrop of science demonstrates that each endeavor at conclusion to build up congruity between one and another outcomes not in a diminishment of the higher to the lower however in making a complementary connection between the two terms which does not in any manner crush the creativity of the higher term. So it is that the useful relations which can exist amongst intellect and biological association can not the slightest bit lessen the value of reason yet despite what might be expected prompt extending the idea of fundamental adaptation.
It is selfevident that if the categories of reason were preformed in biological functioning, they are not contained in it either as conscious or even unconscious structures. In the event that biological adaptation is a kind of material comprehension of the situations, a progression of later structures would be essential all together that conscious and gnostic image may rise up out of this absolutely dynamic mechanism.
It is thusly toward the end and not at the purpose of flight of intellectual advancement that one must hope to experience reasonable ideas truly communicating functioning accordingly, as opposed to the underlying structures which stay on the surface of the organism and of nature and just express the shallow connections of these two terms to each other. In any case, keeping in mind the end goal to encourage examination of the lower stages, it can be demonstrated how the biological invariants offer ascent to a kind of utilitarian apriori of reason.
The categories identified with the capacity of association constitute what Hoeffding calls the central categories. It appears that these categories can be characterized, from the static perspective, by the ideas of totality and relationship and, from the dynamic perspective, by those of ideal and value. The idea of totality communicates the interdependence inborn in each association, astute and biological.
Despite the fact that standards of conduct and consciousness appear to emerge in the most awkward way in the first weeks of presence, they extend a physiological association which precedes them and they take shape from the start into systems whose rationality moves toward becoming elucidated little by pretty much nothing. The schemata having a place with sensorimotor insight controlled from the earliest starting point by the law of totality, inside themselves and in their interrelationships.
Relationship is additionally a principal category, while it is natural in all psychic action and consolidates with the various ideas. This is on the grounds that each totality is an arrangement of connections similarly as each relationship is a fragment of totality. In this limit the relationship shows itself from the coming of the simply physiological exercises and is again found at all levels.
The most elementary discernments are all the while identified with each other and organized into sorted out totalities. It is pointless to accentuate closely resembling realities that one finds on the level of intelligent idea. The categories of ideal and of value express a similar capacity, yet in its dynamic viewpoint. We will call ideal each arrangement of values which constitutes an entire, henceforth every last objective of actions and we will call values the specific values identified with this entire or the methods making it conceivable to accomplish this objective.
The relations of ideal and value are thusly the same as those of totality and connection. These ideals or value of each category are just totalities in procedure of arrangement, value just being the statement of desirability at all levels. Desirability is the sign of a break in equilibrium or of an uncompleted totality to whose development some element is missing and which tends toward this element keeping in mind the end goal to understand its equilibrium.
The relations amongst ideal and value are subsequently of an indistinguishable category from those of totality and of relations which is self-evident, since the ideal is just up ’til now deficient type of equilibrium between genuine totalities and values are none other than the relations of intends to ends subordinated to this framework. Finality is accordingly to be considered not as an uncommon category, but rather as the subjective interpretation of a procedure of putting into equilibrium which itself does not infer finality but rather just the general qualification between genuine equilibria and the thought equilibrium.